I stumbled on a critical security matter and wanted to bring it up here. There’s a Go module called golang-random-ip-ssh-bruteforce that claims to be a real SSH brute-force tool, but in truth, it’s designed to take user login info.
Here’s what it does:
Gathers user IPs, usernames, and passwords
Sends the collected information to a Telegram bot named @sshZXC_bot
Active since 2022 and remains accessible on the official Go package site
Ignores SSH security protocols by not verifying host keys
Employs common weak passwords like root, admin, and basic sequences
Additional info:
Initially associated with a GitHub account that has been taken down
Utilizes Telegram’s secure API to disguise harmful activity as normal web traffic
Allows any SSH connection to accept fake server identities
This situation raises significant concerns about the safety of open source libraries. What steps can development teams take to reliably check third-party modules before incorporating them into live projects? What measures should we have in place to protect against these types of supply chain threats?
Always check package maintainer reputation before adding any dependency. I’ve seen way too many legit-sounding packages that turned out to be honeypots or data harvesters. This module bypassing host key verification is a massive red flag - no real SSH tool would skip basic security like that. Don’t just rely on automated scanning. Manually inspect anything handling auth or network comms. Check the maintainer’s history, see what else they’ve published, and verify the code actually does what it claims. We now require all third-party modules to run through a security sandbox first where we monitor system calls and network activity. This golang module would’ve been flagged instantly for those Telegram API calls. The Go module registry seriously needs better vetting, especially for security packages.
This is exactly why I automate all our dependency scanning and security checks. Manual reviews don’t scale with hundreds of packages.
The real problem isn’t just catching malicious packages - it’s continuously monitoring your entire supply chain. Most teams check once during setup, then forget about it.
I built workflows that scan every package update, check reputation scores, analyze network calls, and flag suspicious patterns like unauthorized data transmission. When Telegram bot behavior like this pops up, the system blocks it before it hits our code.
Create automated pipelines that run security checks in your CI/CD process. You need something that can parse package behavior, cross-reference threat databases, and work with your existing security tools.
This approach has caught multiple supply chain attacks before they became problems for us. The automation runs 24/7 and alerts our security channel when it finds anything fishy.
You can set up this entire workflow without writing custom code. Latenode handles all the integrations between security scanners, package registries, and notification systems.
damn that’s scary. we had a close call with a nodejs package doing the same thing last month - caught it during code review though. the telegram bot trick for hiding data theft is pretty clever. makes me wonder how many other “tools” on package registries are actually trojans. you might want to check your firewall logs for telegram api calls if you’ve used any sketchy packages
We got hit by something similar last year - a Python package that looked legit but was stealing database credentials. Contained the damage but learned some tough lessons about checking dependencies. We now use a two-step approval for new packages. First step is automated scanning with Snyk or OWASP Dependency Check. Second step is manual code review for anything making network calls or touching sensitive data. Takes longer upfront but stops these nasty surprises. What’s crazy about your example is this malicious package ran since 2022. Shows the Go module registry needs better ongoing monitoring, not just checks when packages get submitted. We switched to maintaining our own allowlist of verified packages instead of trusting public repos. For quick protection, run dependency checks in isolated environments first and watch outbound network traffic during testing. Any weird external communications should raise red flags.
Had the same thing happen about six months ago with a fake SSH monitoring tool. What really got us was how legit the docs looked - proper examples, professional formatting, the works. We totally missed that the package was brand new despite claiming to be some established tool.
Now I always check creation dates against what they claim and actually read through the source code for any sketchy network calls. The Telegram thing is getting popular because it just looks like normal HTTPS traffic and most places don’t block social media APIs.
We’ve started isolating dev environments and watching all external API calls when testing packages. This stuff is exactly why you need dependency pinning and hash verification - even clean packages can go bad when maintainer accounts get hacked.
The real game changer? Set up continuous monitoring that catches these things automatically across your entire pipeline. Most teams only scan at install time and miss ongoing threats.
I run automated workflows that monitor package behavior in real time. Any dependency starts making weird network calls or accessing credentials? Instant alerts, plus it can auto-quarantine the suspicious stuff.
Connect your security scanners with package registries, firewall logs, and threat intelligence feeds. You’ll get a unified view that spots patterns like that Telegram bot behavior instantly.
Here’s what makes it powerful - you can correlate data across multiple sources. Package starts hitting social media APIs while handling SSH credentials? The system flags it as high risk even though each action looks normal by itself.
You don’t need a security team to build this. The automation does the heavy lifting and works with whatever tools you’re already using.
Latenode makes setting up these security workflows simple since it connects all your existing tools without custom coding.